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EC-US AGRICULTIJRAL TRADE RELATIONS: DO
POLITICAL COMPROMISES EXIST?
Louis P. Mahé *)
and Terry L. Roe **)
1. Introduction
The history of EC-US conflicts about the Common Agriculrural Policy is long and
rich in events. The US never accepted either the founding principles of the CAP or
their implications. While some periods were rather quiet, sudden outbreaks of con-
flicts have been recurrent. Even if the US finally accepted that a protectionist CAP
was the economic price to pay for the political gain of a united Europe, it could not
live with the variable levy system and even less with its recent use of export restitu-
tions on EC surpluses. Starting in the early 1980's, attempts to complete the CAP by a
tax on fats and oils or by a ceiling on cereal substitute imports have higgered a swift
retaliation by the US (Hathaway 1984; Tracy 1982; Petit 1985).
Naturally, the opposing views on agricultural policy reforms in the EC and the US
have reached a climax in the CATT negotiations of the ongoing Uruguay Round. The
basic position of the US is in favour of a complete'elimination of farm support poli-
cies as long as they are linked with production levels, while the EC is keen on trading
a commitment to a limited cut in price support for a rebalancing of its tariff structure
in favour of imported feeds. Other GATT members are also players in that game, and
the EC export refund system is the main target for complaints. In October 1989, the
US made a new proposal for the transition'period toward decoupled farm pro-
grammes, which basically required an elimination of export subsidies over 5 years
and of other output-linked support policies over 10 years. Although defined in terms
of policy instrumentation, this scheme of agriculture policy adjustment increases
pressure on the EC; and a profound reform of the CAP is the actual target pursued by
the US.
In this paper, we do not intend to review all the issues related to the EC-US agri-
cultural trade conflict, which has attracted a large body of research (see Cathie, 1985;
Curry, 1985; Moyer and Josling,1990 for recent surveys). We should like however, to
address three questions: (1) Why is the conflict so intense, while evidence exists that
the size of interaction is real but not considerable? (2) Why is the EC reluctant to lib-
eralise while the economic gains are large and, correspondingly, why is the US posi-
tion led only by a quest for the welfare efficiency of free trade? (3) Last, can we reveal
the actual policy objectives embedded in the current farm programmes, and by doing
so identify areas for mutual agreement, i.e. for a treaty?
,r) Professor of Agricultural Eqcnomics at the Social Sciences Department of ENSA, Rennes
**) Professor of Agricultural Economics at the Department of Agricultural Economics of the
University of Minnesota
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In the first section we shall analyse three paradoxes in the EC and US positions in
the current GATT round. of negotiâtions. tn ihe second section we shall present esti-
mates of the relative politicat ieighS for various social g:o:rPs affected by-the cur-
rent progr"**"r. ThË resutting pJlitical value function will then be used to delineate
areas for feasible comPromises.
2. Three paradoxes in the Ec-us agricultural trade conflict
At least three paradoxical observations can be made in the context of the EC-US
.gii*t,.rral trade conflict. The first deals with the apparent contrast between the ten-
sions and the threats of generalized trade war often pointed out in the media on the
one hand anrl the relatively limited interactions between the two powers as sug-
;;t1; by several studies on the other. The second is the surprising gap between the
apparent economic gains anrl the reluctance of EC to undertake profound reforms'
The third, which *o! U" more subtle, is that the officjal position of 
.the US is probably
too bolci to be really seriously feasible in regard to US domestic political conditions'
2.1. The lwo big pluyers can help or httrt each otlrcr, but to a linited extent
Many st"aiôi hive exploré,l the implications of agressive measures taken by either
or both partners. They oll r.u* to conclude for a limited magnitude of the cross ef'
fects on aggrr:gate po\Jy indicators (buclget, farrn income, welfare). Anderson and Tye-rs
(19g3) haîi e-stimateci the effect of refaliation by the United States in the form of a
i,.rUri.ry on its wheat exports. "The aduarsg effccts'of such rctaliation are nwclt less for the
iC il,o'n t'or tlrc Llnited Sroro artd arc likcly'io b.e insuffic-iut .to for.ce EC policy .r$o:y.'
Moreoaei, in per capita ttntts Canatla and Àustralia are afftltld nluch nwre than lhe EC"'
paalberg oni Snorples also note that "lilseraliutiln of E!, a!.lapanæe.gffn policies
would rærrlt in smali net bcnefit to tltc lJttitcd Slalcs". Anania, Bohman and Carter have
analyscd the impact of the Export Enhancement Progro.TTu a.nd find that the EEP
,,lras been ablc to irtcruse IJS wtiat exports. Tlrc cost of ttti adtlitional exports has bæn lower
pricæ in connrrcrciûl nwrkûs antl increasetl gm).:rnû:ctrl cosls. ln atltlition, EEP has not
'acttrg,ert its goal of reducitts EC exports becai* of thc variable restittttion sys]an'.. These
authors estimate the resuiting inàease in variable subsidy cost for the EC to be only
103 million rJollars, which ii a small amount compared to EC outlays' Mahé and
Tavéra (,lggz,198S) likewise fountl that the two powers can hurt each other only to a
limiterl extent and that rlomestic effects of policy changes are' muclt larger than cross
effects tlue to the absorption role played by world markets.
Flowever surprising, the first poriOo* is consistent with the often mentioned {gu-
ment that 6omestic forces are more important than external forces in shaping policies
anrl their reforms. It may also be the èase that, when the EC is making concessions,
yi.iaing to US fr.tr.tt., it is in recognition.for the wider economic and political
io*u, Ër tn" US, rather ihan in reg_ard-lo the threat confined to the agrictrlturtlgq:
arena. In a statement before the Éouse of Representatives, M. Mendelowitz (GAO)
mentioned the diverging views on the efficiency of the EEP, but added that abandon'
ing it would give theïËng signll to the EC, in the context of the GATT negotiatiors.
inother eiplanation mù Ë that modelling exercises are very aggregated and do
not specify bilateral tratle fl-ows, which are neuertheless impo.rtant in some commodi-
ties. tf the economic interests vesterJ in particular commodities are not identified,
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a88r€8ate measures on budget and income do not reflect the real weight that pro.
ducer SrouPs may bring to bear on government. If this is true, then môre attention
should be devoted to the nature of political economy and the role of the various
Pecial interest groups that affect economic policy, as possible explanations for thelarge differences in the mode and intensity of public intervention in various com-
modity programmes.
2.1_Economic effcimcy has a limitcd role in the design and the refonn of the CAp
The literature on trade liberalization of the CAP generally conciudes that economic
gains are significant, and many competitors of the EC on the world markets have
strived to display ample evidence that the EC as a whole should gain from liberaliza-
tion of the CAP. Of course these welfare gains are only potendll in the sense that
losers from policy reforms would have to be compensated io accept the changes.
These welfare measures all assume that the various sociàl groups Involved(farmers, consumers, taxpayers) have equal political importance Ët *àignt in the
political economy- of government policy. But this is not lhe case in reality, as pro-
9"!.lt appear to have a larger weight than other groups. An example of lhis is thehigh level of support provided to EC farmers at the eipense of taxpayers and con-
sumers.
Moieover, in order more precisely to identify areas for compromise, it is necessary
to disaggregate farmers into subgroups, as policy instruments differ markedly ac
cording to commodity programmes. If particular commodity groups have higher
political weights, changes affecting these groups will be traidàr to implemer,I, o,
t!9se SrouPs must be compensated to make the changes more acceptable. Aggregate
efficle1cy considerations are therefore not adequate when it comes to underJùnàit g
$e e_C negotiating position or to investigating some likely scenarios of agreement ii
the GATT negotiations. Moreover, in order to find a possible set of politicàlly feasible
trade comPromises between the US and the EC, knowledge of the political weights.of
the various special interest groups in the policy process ii required in order tolevise
a compensatory scheme that will induce them to accept a possible treaty.
2.3 The US position in the GATT is a tactical ratlrcr than a contpromise position luding to a
treaty
While the EC's proposal for trade policy reform clearly shows that economic effi-
gency is not seen as a feasible goal by European governments, the US position - total
dismantling of border and domestic support - would suggest that the ÙS goue*ment
is led only by welfare efficiency considerations.
One possible interpretation is that US negotiators are convinced of the superior
competitivjty of American agriculture and that free trade and higher world prices
would be beneficial to the country's trade balance, to farmer's inéome, and aiso to
taxpayers. There is little doubt that - except when the dollar is greatly overvalued -
S: Ul crop sector_is among the most efficient in the world, and it is widely acknow-ledged that agriculrural policy liberalization would benefit the US grain iector. The
various skirmishes which have occurred on world market outlets where the EC and
the US compete for wheat exports confirm that view, and so does the US cail for
elimination of EC protectionist devices in the food and feed grain sector.
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The evidence is much less obvious for soybeans and corn gluten feed expolF, bI
cause the elimination of the support provided to the livestock sector in the Ec and
other OECD countries would reduce Ëonsiderably the derived demand for feed, thus
àriri"g world prices down sharply (Mahé and Tavéra, 1988). The US policy makers
have n"ot paid !r"ut attention to itl offsetting effecb of reducing or eliminating Tf ---..'
fàrr to uè uveïtock producers on the benefiÉ expected from a liberalization limited
to grain poliry.
Moreover, other farm subsectors in the US would be badly hurt by a full-fledged
trade liberalizatiot. ft. sugar industry is the most obvious example, but the dairy
sector too, which is almost às protect.â ts its EC's counterpart, would-* pyt "."9,tt
tremendous pressure. There ù a debate currently going on in the US^ about the
foi.ntiuf of the dairy sector to become a more aciive exPorter.-Even if world 
prices
ior dairy products sÉould rise sharply-as a result of comple-te liberalization, the high
nominai àte of protection granted io-the milk sector in the US (about 700vo) suggests
that the us dairy indushy would suffer from free trade.
Therefore, the US fré-rrade position in the GATT cannot be convincingly 91
plained by pure economic consiàerations of comparative advantage alone' The US
i*porof i-ttây Ue easier to understand as a tacticai position than as an indication of
the final result it expects from the uruguay Round, i.e. of the content of the treaty
that they would be readY to sign.
As in the case of the Ec, itlr necessary to take into account the political economy
dimensions of the US negotiating positiôn in order to sort-out.tactical and feasible
compromises. Moyer and"yoslinginote that the US position has been tactical "in that
the iero option fi*ia.a ân .*Ë.tt.nr negotiating 
-position,.. 
shifting any blame for
the failurebf the'U*guay Round to the EC..." (p'192)
There 
"r. 
,.u.rol-*ays to interpret the pievious three paradoxes throt-gh the
economic circumstances ând the poiitics of agricuttural policy making in the !9 "t1
the US. In this p"p* *" ao not intend to prôvide a comParative a.nalysis :l E: îrt-q
ÙS .gti*ltural pàti.y decision making, which has already been done by several ot
the cited authors. Our aim is, rather, to-àpproximate a workable representation of the
behaviour of both governments in the trâde negotiations, and so to contribute to a
better understandin"g of the actual underlying acèeptable compromises for both coun-
hies.
In both the EC and the US, the level of support and the type of instruments differ
widely according to commodity prog.ammes, and some s€ctors are clearly easier to
liberalise than oihers. A policy gôal iunction of the government is a useful construct
for interpreting the political ecJnomy of economic policy: Thit construct can be used
to account for the re'lative weighs oi com*odity giouPs Tq to assess their capacity
to prevent some policy reforms while allowing some specified changes'
3. Political weights of commodity groups in the Ec and the us
Several authors have modelled the objective function of government as an ul:on: 
-
strained maximisation of a weighted soâal welfare function over producer welfare,
consumer *etfate unà tu*puy.ri {..g., Rausser and Freebairn, 1974; Riethmuller and
Roe, 19g6). However, taking [h. for* sector as an aggregate does not reflect the heter-
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ogeneity-of commodity programmes and therefore to the relative political strength of
various farmer groups.
3.1 Ranuling the political weights of oarious farmt groups
We report here only the resulb of a research devoted to the estimation of the
political weighs of seven commodity groups in the EC and the US. A detailed ac.
count of the approach is given in Roe, Johnson and Mahé. It combines the estimation
of a Policy Goal Function (f€D, a model of EC-US agrictrltural policy interactions
and game theory.
It assumes that in the reference period, the US and the EC have optimized their be-
haviour, i.e., the US government has maximised ie PGF taking the behaviour of the
EC as given, and conversely. Thus the base year is considered as a Nash equilibrium
of the EC-US agrianlrural rade policy game.
Farmer groups are defined as commodity groups for two reasons. First, it is easier
to model income effects of policies on various commodity producers than on various
types of farmers" The latter option would require a model disaggregated according to
types of farms. While this approach would be useful from a political organizatlon
viewpoint, such a model is not available. Second, commodity-specific farmer unions
exist and are quite active in the defense of the interests of their members. It is ex-
pected that a large part of political pressure works through their channels, even if
general Purpose farmer unions do play a role in the protection of the interests of the
sector as a whole and in the alleviation of the conflicts of interest between farmer
grouPs.
There are eight social groups involved in the PGF. The commodity break down is
the following: grains, protein animal feed, beef, dairy, pork and poultr/, and sugar.
Consumers are taken as a single group, which means that they are assumed to bein,
different as to whether a welfare gain results from a price cut on sugar or one on beei
for example. Taxpayers are also treated as a separate group. Of course there is some
simplification, as these groups do not correspond to clear-cut partitions in society,
and some individuals belong to several groups at the same time. They are not eveniy
affected by farm policy programmes however, and this is why our representation is
expected to be meaningful.
The first apparent reason for expecting different political weights is the relative
level of nominal protection granted to various commodity groups. Table 1 exhibitç
the NRP's (nominal rates of protection) at the producers' lévét inihe EC and the US2
in 1986. There are some similarities in the patterns of protection granted to various
commodities in both countries. But the general level of support is smaller in the US
than in the EC and it is particularly so for oilseeds products, beef and pork and poul-
try. The other main difference is due to the US deficiency payment system on giains,
which puts the burden of support on the taxpayer and not on the consumer as in the
EC.
The political value function is defined as a weighted sum of the gains that the
various social groups derive from the policies implemented. The PGF is just a way to
order different states of the economy. It is therefore defined up to a monotonic trans-
formation. Hence the weights must be normalized to be easilyinterpreted, and in the
present case, taxpayers are given a weight equal to one.
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Table 1
Nominal rates of protection "), 1986
EC US
producer consumer producer consumer
Grains
Protein feeds
Beef
Pork and poultry
Dairy
Sugar
78
95
75
20
94
170
i0
0
5
0
69
120
80
0
75
20
80
701
56
10
5
0
80
120
*) Definerl as 100 x (prorJucer price - border price) devideti by borcie'r price
7
V= L ai Ti+Tt
t- I
7
IqDr'/ ôg' +âT, /Agi 0; i=1,...,7
rvhcrc, tlc â,s irrc thc political rvcights ancl thc T's tlte' trirnsicrs bcrrt'iitting to the
groups. Tt is thc transfclr to titxpilvcis or buclgct receipts. Thc list of prtlr-lttccr groLlps
ii=r i.r 6) is givt'p irr tlblc 1 irrrri i=7 re'prcscrrts thc consunler grottP. Since tvL'rlsstlll'lt'
t5.t t6e blsi ye,rr l9ti6 rvas an clptimal situation ftlr btlth thc' EC and the' US, tltt' \'
functitln was ilt ù nrirxinrunl in this vt'irr; thc'reforc thc policv instrun1t'ttts n'crc
ch.sr.n so .ls trl nrirximise V, anci thcv ve'rifv thc first tlrrlcr condititlns ftlr thc PCI; ttl
rcach rt nrirxinrtlnl, i.L'.,
(l)î)V /dgi =0 ;i=1,'.',7
(l)
(3)
rv6crc g; is thc jth ptllicy instrunrcnt. lvl.rking ttsc tlf (1) rvc gct il sct tli sl'\'cll c(ltt'l-
titlns in 3.-'vcn unknorvns, tltc ct's.
i= I
By irltcrilg t6c ptllicv instruntcnts tli c'irch conrnroclitv progr.lnllrlt' .llltl 0i thc ctltt-
sunlcr group, a sci of cstimirte's for ôTi/àgi wirs oLrtirincd .rnd (3) lvûs stllvcd ttlr tltc
as. TirËle 2.sholvs the values of thc rveijhts derivt'd irtln'r this proccss. Atr itrtcr-
nirtional trade motlel is neetlcd to gr.'ne'raie thc' ôTi 7 ô8i ls thc' EC and thc US arc
large enough to affect world priceslvhen their policics ire ch.rnged. The impract on
if.,u" U".fgui tar, / Aù shouiri there,fore account for this tLrrms oi trndc c't[c'cts.
More,over some progrïtn*cs, as for oilsc.eds in the EC irnd tor mirnv conrmoditic's in
t5e US, clo not iiolù rJomc'stic prices from world prices, so thitt thc rvt'li.trc tlf ctltr-
sumcrs and of somL' produccrs (e.g. livestock) clc.pc'ttti on rvtrrld ç'rrict' ch.tngcs.
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Table 2
Political u'eights of various commodity groups and of consumers in the EC and the
US
US EC
weight (cr's) rank weight (a,s) rank
Sugar
Dairy
Protcin feeds
Grains
Tax payers
Beef
Consumers
Pork and poultry
1.56
1.29
r.23
1.15
1.00
0.92
0.87
0.85
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1.57
"t.46
1.32
1.3.{
1.00
r.32
0.83
0.95
1
2
4
3
6
4
8
7
The relative size of the political wcights does not depend only on the level of sup
port, but also on the burden that the particular producer group is able to put on othàr
SrouPs. To see why, consider the simple case where there are no cross effects between
commodity groups (ATi / 3 gi 0 for i *i,i,j = 1 to 6). The equation for the jth weight
amounts to:
oi aTi / àg,+ %àTz / àg,+ ATt / agj=
It turns out that for a given effect on the welfare of producer j (ôT; / ôg,), the
rveight atrvill be larger, the larger the effects on consumers and taxpayerd in a6Àolute
value, as'long as they are negative, which is true in most cases. in other words, a
commodity group will have higher weighs if the benefit it gets costs more to con-
sum€rs and taxpayers. This approach could be extended to other commodity groups.
The weights in table 2 therefore reflect a richer information than the nominal ràtes
of protection, as they depend on the type of instrument used to provide the income
transfer to a particular commodity group. Take the dairy produCers in the EC as an
example. Not only do they benefit from a high support but, because of the net ex-
porting position, the producer surplus is larger than consumer surplus, and tax pay-
ers must finance the export subsidies, hence a high weight to dairy producers in tÉe
EC.
The first noticeable observation drawn from the analysis is the smaller weight of
consumers in the EC in comparison to the US consumers. This is consistent wiitr ttre
different lyPes of policy instruments used in both countries for many products, par-{*ltttyj"r grains, and with the smaller taxation of consumers of animâl producË in
the US. The ranking of commodity groups is actually not so different in thô two coun-
tries, with sugar and dairy producers at the top and pork and poultry producers at or
near the bottom. Grain producers however have a smaller reiative wèigtrt in the US
than in the EC, and this is even more clearly the case for beef producers.
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3.2 A brief interpretation of the relatiue weights
It is outside the scop" âf tnit PaPer tùttempt a full explanation of the structure of
tn. pofitic.l weights o? the variouJproducer.gio.tns, A few remarks drawn ftom pub-
Iîc ihoice theory"î. rppropriate, however. public choice explanations stress the impor-
tance of the .ort of àrgànization and, therefore, of the number of agents and the
concenffation in the ind"ustry. The relatively low weight accorded to consumers rela-
tive to taxpayers is consistent with this expianatio-n. So is the case of sugar producers
in both countries, * ;h;t are fairly few ând as the.industry is.highly concentrated'
ifr"i, ability to ileP tt e i',igtt level'of s-uPPgri is-probably also due to the low budget
cost of the sugar pilgtutn,,i.s in the gC âria the US, which puts the burden mainly on
the less well-organized consumers' 
. ible than consumer surprus ross.Budget cost or tax payers exPenses are more vlsl
Consumers must makà costly investments in information if they want to show their
loss anci make their case in the democratic process. The budget cost on the other hand
is obvious every year and attracts more icrutiny both from government and from
public opinion. î(er"fore costly Programmes are expected.to be less sustainable' The
iairly large political weight to ftàin [ro.lucers as reflected in 1986 in both the EC and
the ÛS, Ë portty due to"the niîtoricit rigiciity of programlgs.which were not costly
when they were initiated. The EC has not b".o*e self-sufficient in grains until the
early eighties, anrl the us Target Price set in 1980 was not so far alvay from tl're worlcl
price, which has droppetl in d'ollars in the early eighties. The stabilisers in the EC and
the retjuction in the'ùs rarget price and the Loan Rate introduced since by the us
farm bill tentl to confirm this interpretation. To a large extent,-the fairly-high. rveight
fir*n to oilseetl fro.l,.rcers in the EC can be accounted for by a similar historical
de,velopment, to *tti.tr the low self-sufficiency of the EC in protein feed has con-
tributed.
At first sight, the ranking of dairy producers is not so easy to explain by the con-
ce.ntration anr1 cost of orgaîization aigument' There are here many producers' lvho
yct manage to develop lirge political !o*ot. In the US horvever, the history of pre
tection has its rq>ts in the îormation oi market orders and agreements for dairy pre
ducers. This *os- portly stimulaterj by fairly large and. well organized dairy
cooperatives. The cooperatives provicl.â on ôrganizational structure that in fact
scrverj to lower the cost of coalition formation, i.e., the cost of forming-grouPs of simi-
lar interest:s at the local level, thus making it possible subsequently to launch effective
lobbying efforts at the national level. The- mirket order and agreement structure and
the cu:perative structure also providr',1 a mechanism to solve the free rider problc'nr
so trrrrt rril ,Jairy farmers rvoul.i be taxerJ to suppo_rt the cost of a lobbying eifort. To a
large extent this argument is also valir.l for thô Éc *here cooperatives have been im-
poitrnt actors in tf,e dairy inciustry. The relatively low income of ,dairy producers
i.nurot.,f by free markei forces has also contributed to make the support pro-
grammes more ...-.ptture to public opinion, at least in the past. Agail ,ft recently
f,ilf,"t cost of ttre prlgramme'have leà to supply control measures, with the all buy-
out scheme in the fus ina production quotas in ti',. EC. This shift of the burden on the
consumer alone,-an,J the ieste,l interàst in protluction rights,-together are likely to
keep the rank oi tlairy protlucers high in the scale for the near future. Beef producers
in the EC are still, duâ io the comple-mentarity between beef and milk in the EC, most
of them dairy producers; hence their weight is similar to that of dairy producers'
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Thc situations of pork and poultry producers in the EC and of pork, poultry and
beef producers in the US are rather similar. Although the concentration in the in-
dustry is high, they have not been able to attract much support. The high elasticity ar-
gument proposed by Cardner for animal products in the US seems to be relevant.
These producers are often well-off in Europe in spite of unstable prices, they are not
viewed as typical family farm operators but rather as commercial farmers, and policy
makers fear a rapid accumulation of surpluses if higher support were granted to the
industry.
Even if a fully adequate political economy explanation of the relative weights is
not yet available, they do not seem at odds with the intuition of policy analysis. lt is
now worth investigating thc light they may provide on the CATT negotiations.
4. Feasible compromises bctween the EC and the US
Various stages of farm policy reforms were simulated for the EC and the US, troth
in unilateral and bilateral rvays. These actions lead to impacts on policy indicators
n'hich can be presented in the pay-off matrix of a game as in table 3. In the CATT
context the political pav-offs are uscd in preference to pay-offs based on classical rvel-
fare gains. On thc'basis of the matrix of political gains and losses in the EC and thc
US, feasiblc conrpromiscs in the ncgotiations are shown to exist.
4,1 Portinl libtaliulion and drcouplcd cunyntsatory ynynrcnls
Four actions are investigated, rvith increasing deg;ree of trade liberalization for
both porvers. More precisely, the possitrle actions simulated for the US are:
- (sq) The status quo of 1986;
- (bpes) Ban on producer and export subsidies; free trade in all commoditic's cxce.pt
beef, sugar, and dairy, self-sufficiency in dairy is follorved u'hile sugar prices ancl
beef quotas remain at the status quo;
- (pft) Partial free trade; free trade in grains, animal feeds, becf, and pork and poul-
try; dairy and sugar policies remain at the status quo;
- (ft) Free trade; free trade in all commodities.
For the EC they are:
- (sq) The status quo of 7986;
- (bpes) Ban on export restitutions; ad ztaloran tariffs are used to attain self-suffi-
ciency in grains, beef, pork and poultry, dairy, and sugari price differentials, in
percentages, between producers and consumers remain at the status quo; the farm
price of oilseeds is unchanged;
- (pft) Partial free trade; ad ualoretn tariffs of 20 per cent are imposed on grain and
beef, the oil seed cake support is reduced to 20 per cent above world market price;
pork and poultry prices are leveled with world market prices; dairy and sugar
prices remain at the status quo;
- (ft) Free trade; Free trade in all commodities.
The economic results are summarized in Table 3; the US chooses the row, the EC
chooses the column. Before discussing the game matrix of the welfare gains, the key
economic outcomes of the simulations are briefly summarized. For comparable ex-
periments, the results obtained from the model are similar to those obtained from
CEC. In general, liberalisation causes large increases in the world prices of grains,
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Table 3
Welfare gains from policy reforms *) billion ECU)
US policy action EC policy action
sq bpes pft fr
US EC US EC US EC US EC
sq
bpes
Pft
ft
0
2.5
1.5
3.0
0
0.4
0.1
0.9
6.4
6.6
6.3
6.8
0.4
2.8
1.8
3.3
0.3
0.3
2.0
2.7
8.5
8.5
8.9
8.8
0.3
2"2
-0.8
2.6
30.
3.3
3.7
4.7
*) The South-East number is the US welfare gain and the North-West is the EC's gain'
beef, sugar, anti rJairy, decreases in the prices o-f oil seed cakes and Feed Crain Substi-
tute,s (pëS), nn6 s*niier changes in the price of pork and poultry. Three factors deter-
mine these results: crop prorliction shift in the US from grains to oilseeds, feed input
substitution in thc ECirirrn oil stecl cakes and fec'd grain substitutes (FCS) to grains,
and lowe'r fecri input tiemancl of bc'ef, rJairy, and pork and poultry producers in the
EC due to the contraction of the animal sector'
T6e strict economic results lvoultl pretlict that both countries should move to free
tr;rcie. Classical welfare efficicncy3 hotuuu.r, is not the only policy goal purs"u9.by
EC anr3 US gqvernmL'nts. Table 3 shorvs that (ft, ft) is a $ash eciuilibrium of this
game; frce trîcJe is a dominant strategy whatever the other plaver does. If this game
lvcre re'alistic one would expect the pixitions exprcssed in the CATT to be far bolde'r
than rvhat we observe. Sinc'e the'y are not, lfovL'rnments nrost certainly h1-uu a more
conrplc'x objective function and social group rve'ights in thc' PCF must differ, as lvas
shown in Table 2.
The games presenterl in Table 4 are morL' rele'vant for understanding the CAfi
roun.l. ît.r" pny-offs in Tirble .t (game one) are now the values of the PCF associatecl
rvith each combination of actionJ taken by the EC and the US. Liberalization of farm
policies cloes not ilppear likely at all if countries limit their margin of mantxuvre to
i1.," ..rrrunt policy inrt..rrr,.nts. Although each country should like for the othe'r
plirycr to moue toivar,Js free trar.le, it willluffer a political loss if it makes the move it'
ictt. oomt-'stic policies again matter more than policies of other countries. Civen the
set of policy initrume'nts-used in the past, the piospect of an agreement in the CATT
is bleak, esiecially if the pCF calibratË'J on the bnr.yeat 1986 still reflects the political
rveights of social gfouPs relevant for the 1990 situation.
FËasible .o*pio*ir"r r.qtrire the use of new policy instruments and Table 4
(game two) illustrates the ouicomes of a liberalization combined with compensatory
d"ecoupled payments. Game two is derived from Same one in the following way'
nu,Jget ,ouinfr resulting from policy changes are used to compensate producer
grou"pr, the g-roups witÈ highesi weights being comPensated 
-first. There are not
Ëno.rgt savinlgs to compensaie all pro,Jucer Bloupt, because of efficiency loss and bc*
..r.,ru"of the la-rge share of the current policies burden bc'ing borne by consumers'
ll0
Table 4
Policy{oal Function Values for Alternative U.S. and E.C. Trade Liberalization Strate.
gies and Decoupled Payments
us\ec-action') Game One: Using 1986 Action Space
sq ber pft ft
sq
Pft
ber
ft
-653
-560
-2075
697,
540,
233,
-877,
-9407
-4948
-469',|
-4409
0, 0**)
?99
517
1020
472, -7699
-'lM, -1795
-234, -159
-7472, -1433
637, -2385
192, -1905
165, -1459
-7329, -656
us\ec-action') Canre Two: Using Decoupled Payments
sq ber' pft' ft'
sq
Pft'
bcr'
fr'
0,
1466,
2?76,
1559,
0
?99
517
1 020
412,
1905,
248/.,
2099,
2057
1931
2242
ttqq
637,
2071,
2853,
2400,
-798
-168
351
1334
697,
2606,
2968,
2600,
t6
424
640
868
*) see text for definition of actions.
**) x, y is x = VE6us and y = V86cc.
Came two shorvs that fcasible compromiscs betwecn the EC and the US exist if dc..
coupled payments are used. The nrost prefcrred action coresponds to bpes, i.e, a ban
on production and export subsidics in the US on grains and dairy and a ban on ex-
port subsidies with a return to se.lf-sufficiency in the EC for grains, beef, pork and
poultry, dairy and sugar (oilseeds bcing unaffected).
As the savings are not enough to fully compensate producers, decoupled pay-
ments make freer trade politically acceptable, but not full-fledged free trade. It is still
politically necessary to keep some of the burden put on consumers, because of their
low weights. Freer trade results, free trade does not.
4.2 Tarit'fication and rehalancing opcn aacnucs t'or a treatyA new 9e1 of policy instrumenls was also introduced, based on the negotiationgposition of the EC. Rebalancing implies trading tariffs on feed imports for a decreasé
in the support provided to grain and oilseeds in the EC.
This scenario is first explored on the basis of the oil seed sector only. Before im-
plementing increasing levels of tariff on oilseeds and cakes, the EC gets rid of the
crushing subsidy, and the support is only provided by the tariff. Table 5 illustrates
the results of this scenario on both the EC and the US PGF's. When the EC abolishes
the producer subsidy, world prices for oilseeds and cakes increase and US soybean
producers benefit from this terms of trade effect, hence also the US grain in PGF.
When the EC-imposes increasing levels of tariffs, the US PGF decreases continuously,
as the gains from the lower EC producer price are increasingly offset by the lossés
8l
Table 5
Impact of tariffication and rebalancing in oilseeds on the PGF's
EC Tariff on oilseeds (Vo)
01020304050607080
EC PGF
US PGF
-200 60
2',10
220
140
310
3
190
-100
770
-45
280
-50
295
70305
-80
-90
due to the EC tariff. A tariffication at 40To or less leaves the US better off than in the
status quo. Tariffication has a different pattern of effect on the EC's PGF. When the
crushing subsitly is abandoned, the EC suffers a political loss, because the income
loss of oll seed pio,Jucers is larger than the tax payers' gain and because the weight of
the former group is higher. When increasing levels of tariffs are implemented. the
EC's PCF inireaies ancl- reaches a maximum at a 40 Per cent tariff. Higher levels of
tariff impose a larger loss on livestock producers and the PCF decreases.
EC animal feed tariff rate (%)
-15 -10 -5
Cut in nominal rate of protection (o/d of EC grain and oil seed
(producer level only lor oilseeds)
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Figure 1. An EC-US Treaty zone based on Tariffication and Rebirlancing
ril
From Table 5 it appears that a tariffication of up to 40 per cent makes both the EC
arrd the US better off in terms of the PCF. Tariffication and rebalancing do open areas
ior fcasible compromises. But the change in the PGF are fairly small as compared to
game two, so that the possibility for both powers to gain from tariffication and rc-
balancing is likely to be sensitive to the base year situation.
The domain of a feasible treaty was further explored by extending the rebalancing
concePts to grains and to feed grain substitutes. A feasible neaty zone was uncovered
where both the EC and the US would be better off than in the status quo. It is il-
lustrated on figure 1. The EC tariff rates on imported feed are indicated on the y-axis
and the decrease in nominal rate of protection on grains and oilseeds on the x-axis.
From the analysis of a rcbalancing limited to oilseeds, we expect that the PGF of
the EC increases in the north-west direction when support is less reduccd on grains
and oilseeds, while tariffs on imported feeds are increased at the same time. Clearly,
the US's PCF decreases in that direction and therefore improves when we move
torvard the south-east. The le'ft hand limit of the treaty zone corresponds to combina-
tions of tariffs and support cuts which keep the EC indifferent to the status quo. The
right-hand limit means the same thing for the US. Combinations within tlre treaty
zonc improve the political gains and therefore correspond to feasible compromiscs
betrvecn the EC and the US, rvith a tariff range from zero up to 30 pcr cent and a cut
in nominal prote'ction of up to 15 per cent. Here again, as in Table 5, the changes in
political gains arc fairlv snrall.
This invcstigation has shorvtr that thc political economy dimension is necessary to
l'rrovide a rationalc fclr the ncgotiatirrg positions in the CA]T and to solve thc para-
doxcs nrc'ntioned in the first sectirln. Tirc EC is likely to move furtht.r torvards lilrcrali-
zation than its early de'claration in the CA1T suggested, but new policy instrunrents
are necessary. The US is unlikely to fetch complete trade libcralizaiion in thô CATT.
Freer trade is likely, free trade is not.
Thcre are obvious limits to the present investigation. Two may be mentioned. The
reference vear used, namely 1986, is somewhat exceptional, and the respcctivc
rve'ights are not necessarily relevant for 1990. A sensitivity test was done howcvcr,
shor+'ing that they are fairly stable. Still, the situation of marke[s and budget outlays
has evolved since i986 and the treaty zone relevant today may look different. Appli-
cation of the 1986 lveights to the i988 base year confirms this change in the econonric
outlook, and shows that the domain of feasible compromises between the EC and the
US has shrunk, so that a treaty seems less likely now.
Another caveat is in order. It is not certain that recipients of decoupled payments
value one ECU from the budget as one ECU from market price support, since de-
coupled transfers will be harder to sustain in the long run.
To sum up, the outcome of the negotiations is uncertain, as both the EC and the US
seem to be close to indifferent where the status quo in terms of political pay-offs is
concerned. Feasible compromise based on compensation and,/or on rebalànting ex-
ists however. Further exploration, with a game extended to the other OECD côun-
_Tj.t, d*l suggest improved feasibility of a treaty, so that some degree ofliberalization within the GATT is altogether likely.
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5. Summary' Conclusions
The international game played in the EC-US agricultural trade conflict cannot be
explained only on th"e basis of classical welfare ànalysis. which would predict free
tràe due to éffi.iency gains. A political value function is more relevant to the ex-
flanation of govern*.tit behaviôur. The various producer glouPs_ aPPear -to have
quite differenî pottical weights, in the EC as well as in the US, and the rankings of
tire various sociâl groups involved differ in both countries.
The pay-off maÉix of liberatization strategies expressed in terms of the PGF shows
that both countries would prefer status quo to policy reforms. But when decouPled
payments, compensating thi most poweriul-producers, are made, some degree of re'
ioi* is made pôlitically feasible. Hôwever, if freer trade is likely, t'ree trade is not.
There is also room io. u treaty between the EC and the US based on tariffication
and rebalancing. However, the political gains are small and recent changes in the en-
vironment have reduced the domain of feasible agreement5.
Therefore both t6e EC and the US appear close to becoming indifferent to a treaty
basetl on rebalancing. Compensation ànd deco.tpled payments seem to be the only
avenue towards significant policy reforms likely to be traveled within the CAfi.
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Notes
1. Agra Europe (London) n'1405.
2. Actual-protection rates used in the calibration of the political weights (with the
help of the Miss model, Mahé, Tavéra, Trochet) are shôwn, rather than the pSE's
calculated by OECD. But they have a similar magnitude (when defined in the
same way).
3. Classical welfare amounts to supposing that oi = 1 for all i in the pGF.
